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Europeanisation and National Public Spheres:
The Issue of the Nice IGC 2000 in the British, German,
Spanish and Austrian Press1
Kathrin Packham und Michael Osterhoff
1. Introduction
The Intergovernmental Conference, which took place in Nice in December 2000, had
to fulfil ambitious expectations. The heads of government gathered in order to accomplish
the necessary institutional reforms to prepare the European Union for the entrance of the
considerable number of applicant states. This joint effort was not achieved without harsh
bargaining between the member states. Since all of them were equally involved, the IGC
seemed to be a premium issue for a comparison of the national public debates with the
guiding question: Is there a europeanisation of national public discourses? Object of
scrutiny was the coverage of the Council in different national print media.
There is a lively theoretical controversy going on among political science scholars, who
engage themselves with the question of how to solve the ”democratic dilemma” of
European policy-making (Dahl 1994). In this context the concept of ”public sphere” has
come to a new rise. Some argue that with the emergence of a European public sphere
citizens will be enabled to participate effectively in the democratic process. Within this
argument, the literature can be divided into a very ambitious normative approach presented
by Jürgen Habermas and more empirical approaches, such as the one of Jürgen Gerhards
and Reiner Grundmann. Others, with Peter Graf Kielmannsegg in the lead, defend the
thesis that a European public sphere will never occur due to the lack of a common
language, common experiences and other reasons. We did not want to align with either of
them and therefore chose the centre position: looking empirically for the status-quo,
hoping to find a European public sphere, but not expecting it.
                                                          
1 This Working Paper draws on a collective term paper, in the framework of a research seminar by Prof. Dr.
Ulrike Liebert, with Stefanie Sifft "Europeanisation and national public spheres" (Europäisierung nationaler
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Reviewing the literature is the content of the first part of this paper. After discussing
the different approaches, we came up with three major research questions:
1) Is there a similar mass media coverage of the IGC Nice in the chosen member states?
And if so, is there a synchronisation amongst the countries of the issues related to the
conference?
2) Is there also a synchronisation of actors? Who are these actors and are there cross-
border linkages between them?
3) Do the chosen newspapers discuss these European issues from a European point of
view?
Is there any evidence that they mostly confine their coverage to national interests?
The second part is considered to present our research design and the methods we
used, i.e. how we operationalised the questions. We selected the internet archives of eight
daily newspapers from four different countries in order to gather our data material.
The empirical findings are presented in the third part and, concentrating on the
German and the British national debate, are qualitatively interpreted in the last section of
this paper. In the end the results are summed up: There are promising hints with regard to
the synchronisation thesis, but, as the emergence of a common European public sphere is
concerned, there is still a long way to go.
2. Theoretical framework
Our leading assumption was that a public sphere on a European level is a necessary
precondition for legitimising European policy making. Moreover, without such a platform
the European people can not articulate a common will with regard to the policies they want
their representatives to achieve and in addition hold them accountable if the demands are
not satisfactorily met. The function of a European common interest would than be to
legitimise the binding decision making on the supranational level (Bellier 2000).
                                                                                                                                                                         
Öffentlichkeiten), Winter Term 2000-1, University of Bremen, Programme European Politics/Studies. All
papers are exact reproductions of the authors' texts.
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To begin with we had to define a public sphere. In other words, we had to answer the
question: What is a public sphere? A broad definition, supplied by Friedhelm Neidhardt,
states that a public sphere is an ”open communication space for all those who want to say
something and those who want to listen” (Neidhardt 1994: 7). This definition above all
stresses an important element of a public sphere: This is the accessibility, a recurrent
demand in the literature, which suggests that everybody should be able to make his/her
and in case of collectives its position available to the public (and the other way round
information has to be publicly obtainable) (see also Peters 1994: 44).
What are the other elements of a public sphere? Jürgen Habermas’ normative concept
of a deliberative democracy locates it at the intermediary level between the ”vermachteten”
political sphere on the one hand and the ”autonomous” society on the other. The decision
making process is supposed to have a discursive character: Individual and collective actors
mainly from within the civil society refer and try to convince each other by using rational
arguments (Habermas 1990: 352-359).
The discursiveness thus increases the level of rationality and will lead to a more
sensible result on the basis of a consensus. The ultimate functions of this discursive,
deliberative public sphere are to optimise the legitimacy of decisions and also to enhance
the sense of community by achieving a consensus or a supported majority vote.
Gerhards undertook the effort to apply the Habermasian criteria to the §218 debate in
Germany and came up with the result that especially actors of the civil society did not
reach up to the high expectations that were imposed on them. He convincingly showed
that it is hard to find empirical evidence for deliberation (Gerhards 1997). This lead us to
look for a more basic concept enabling the mass media to play a prominent role in it.
According to Gerhards, the main function of a public sphere is to provide
transparency, more precisely the visualisation of issues, which serves as a means for the
agenda-setting in a given society (Gerhards 1997:12).
Following this idea, it becomes most evident that if people are not informed about the
specific contents of political decisions they are not able to develop interest at all.
Furthermore, they will therefore remain indifferent towards the political system, which has
a different quality than in case of a deliberate decision against participation, because in the
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first case citizens might withdraw diffusive support from the political system in general.
(Easton 196? : 391-394)
The most basic precondition for a lively public sphere is therefore the demand for
transparency and information, which is, in democratic polities, usually met by societal
organisations as well as by the personal surroundings of individuals. Since cross-national
personal bonds are still an exception and the significance of European parties, social
movements, unions etc. is marginal (Grundmann 1999), we expected the mass media to be
the most likely place for a public sphere to emerge. In times of declining party- and
organisation membership (see Höreth 1998) the media tend to be the main source for
monitoring and communicating information not only in the national context. This should
be even more true for the European public arena.
 The mass media help to define political issues and to shape public opinion. In short,
the essential relationship between the media, a possibly emerging public and the political
system is that a) the media provide the information, which is needed to b) enable the public
to pursue the agenda-setting function in order to c) produce a demand, which than serves
as an input for the political sphere. Therefore participation ”depends crucially on the
interest, knowledge, and motivation of citizens” (Grundmann 1999: 129).
As the Commission put it in the Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for
Broadcasting especially for Satellite and Cable: ”Information is a decisive, perhaps the most
decisive, factor in European communication.... European unification will only be achieved
if Europeans want it. Europeans will only want it if there is such a thing as European
identity. A European identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed. At
present, information via mass media is controlled at national level” (CEC 1984).
This is kind of our starting thesis. The question remains, though, what exactly it means
to be ”adequately informed”.
The media act rather different compared to traditional intermediary organisations,
because they are not representing the interests of their members in order to reach a
common aim, or even a general good, but are in fact primarily concerned with making
money. Their interest is to sell information (and entertainment) to the customers, the
recipients. This has two major implications: the first is that the media therefore depend on
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those who supply this information and on those whose positions in the society naturally
generates public interest. This is the case with politicians for they are by definition
concerned with public problems. The second consequence is that the media also have to
take into account the political attitudes of the ”paying audience” ( see Neidhardt 1994:36).
These can be manifold, the best known for the medium newspaper is probably the
differentiation between rather liberal or on the opposite rather conservative oriented
papers. Another example might be that journalists may well consider the great amount of
sympathy a certain politician enjoys within the population before criticising that person’s
politics too harshly. In short, one can either consider the media as being a part of the
political sphere or as concerned with meeting the customers opinions most adequately. But
even if both options are balanced out perfectly, which would make them the best of all
possible intermediaries, one has to keep in mind the distinct self-interest of the Media.
It is precisely the different dependencies why it is important to carefully scan the
information supplied to the public by the media if we consider it’s stark impact on the
public opinion, and the way the eventual opinion is constructed (Neidhardt 1994: 11,
Grundmann 1999: 127).
In searching for a European public, we will not follow a normative approach, but will
restrict ourselves to the empirical task of looking at the status-quo of the European media
landscape.
Transparency of political systems is indispensable for their legitimacy :”The deficit of
public precedes the often-discussed democratic deficit [...) of the EC, is indeed one of it’s
causes.”(Gerhards 1993: 99).  In order to gain insight on the shape of a public on the
European level, it is important to analyse this indispensable precondition first of all in
regard to the coherence of the information that are distributed by the media in the different
member states. The non-existence of a European media system is in this line of the
argument the severest barrier on the way to a European public. Gerhards even defines ”a
uniform European public” as ”uniform European media system” (1993: 100).
In order to approach a possibly emerging public sphere on the European level,
however, we looked for an additional empirical tool enabling us to compare the different
patterns of how national newspaper cover  the chosen issue. It should, above all, consider
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suitably the need for coherence in regard to the given information. We decided to follow
Reiner Grundmann, who starts out with detecting a ”threefold European deficit”
(Grundmann 1999: 125) in regard to the democratic deficit of the institutional structure,
the lack of an European identity and the missing condition for both: the Public Sphere. He,
too, believes that the latter is the basic level of analysis if  ”…the main task of European
unification is the creation of a legitimate leadership” (1999: 126-127). Regrettably he does
not differentiate between the public sphere as such and the media as only a certain part of
it: ”Political issues are mainly defined through mass media and public opinion is to a large
degree influenced by the mass media” (1999:127). The terms are therefore often
interchangeable.
He distinguishes between two proposals in order to achieve a public sphere on an
European level. The first is the ”Europeanisation” of national public spheres, which he
believes would already ”facilitate” justifying binding decision making. In this state of the
development of a European public sphere the same issues would be discussed in the
national public arenas at the same time, and thus can be considered of some importance to
the voters. He calls this the ”Synchronisation of public attention across member states”
(1999:126). The argument is that, if there are distinctively European issues, a
synchronisation between the national media arenas will occur, i.e. the media in the different
European states will cover this issue at the same time, because it is besides being of
European interest also of concern to the respective national sphere. To really europeanise
national publics this is not sufficient,  but rather issues have to be discussed from a
European perspective. This is why Synchronisation in Grundmann´s line of argument is
only the precondition for a ”homogenisation”, which would occur after the national media
had become synchronised for some time. This second approach means to look for the
development of a single European public sphere with the media not only covering the
same issues at the same time but also with the same relevance and with considering them
to be originally European (1999: 136).
 The term ”Europeanisation” in Jürgen Gerhards work already involves a coverage of
European issues with a non-national approach, but he also still differentiates between a
single European public and the Europeanisation of national publics. A ”European
perspective” would mean that the general perception of what is of interest for national
communication is extended (Gerhards 1993: 102).
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Grundmann is well aware of the fact that his second proposal is a far more challenging
one. The obvious advantage in terms of legitimising  EU-policies is that a European public
would be able to exercise its agenda-setting function appropriately. ”Only under this
condition could citizens choose political answers to these issues and, on this basis, elect
their leaders”  (1999: 127) (and vote them out of office if their demands are not met). A
homogenous public sphere would subsequently lead to a supranational identity. To our
great regret he does not exactly give reasons why this should automatically be the case.
Grundmann did a cross-national study comparing a selection of articles in three major
newspapers (Financial Times, Le Monde, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung)  on the mad-
cow-disease and the Euro for the years 1995 to1998 in order to test his synchronisation
thesis.  In our comparative newspaper study we will start out the same way, but will also
undertake the task to see if homogenisation in a trans-national manner has occurred by
adding a qualitative content analysis of  selected parts of the newspaper coverage.
We chose to try Grundmann´s framework on the issue of the intergovernmental
conference, which took place in Nice in December last year. Bearing his approach in mind,
and being rather sceptical about the outcome, regarding especially the homogenisation
thesis, we took a look on how the national media cover the IGC and also the actors
involved. The reasons for our scepticism lie on the one hand in the nature of the IGC itself
(being primarily about bargaining the different positions on how the reform of the EU-
institutions should look like) and on the other hand in the logic lacking in Grundmann`s
concept. Homogenisation does not seem to be an automatic consequence of an
accomplished synchronisation of an European public sphere; there is a qualitative step and
he does not explain through which mechanisms this ”upgrading” shall be achieved.
The analysis of such an abstract phenomenon seemed rather difficult. We took
advantage of examination tools others had developed before.
Neidhardt proposes some categories which can be used in order to analyse a public
sphere. The communication space is composed of different characteristics, the first being a
certain set of actors, whom he calls speakers: representatives of intermediary organisations,
advocacy groups, experts, intellectuals, and journalists. He adds a defined range of
communication patterns as well as the differentiation of the ”ruling” public opinion in
contrast to the so called ”Bevölkerungsmeinung” (Neidhardt 1994: 12) These distinctions seem
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to be useful categories for analysing the given material. We will also use the work of Jürgen
Gerhards, who provided us with some facts limiting the probability of the emergence of a
public sphere, which are most likely to be found in the mechanisms of the media itself.
Although we did not primarily look for discursive communication patterns, we
nevertheless included the underlying question if the media could eventually function as a
platform for a deliberative public sphere.
3. Research design and Methods of analysis
Working in a group required an efficient division of work. Since our resources were
limited, we were not able to compare the media coverage on the IGC in all of the 15 EU
member states, but had to make a sensible choice for only four of them (this seemed
manageable because our team consisted of four people). The same is true for the number
of analysed papers and the time span we were going to scrutinise.
3.1 Selection of issue and time span
The guiding research questions made it indispensable for us to pay attention to only
one European topic which seemed to attract mutual interest among the chosen papers.
The Intergovernmental Conference in Nice in December 2000 was such a topic. The
conference was a two year process, ending with the European Council which took place in
Nice from the 7th to the 9th of December 2000, at least this was for how long it was
originally scheduled to last. Actually it took the Heads of states two more entire days and
nights to come up with an ambivalently perceived result in form of the Treaty of Nice. This
choice also determined the time span of our analysis. We considered two full weeks around
the IGC as sufficient to capture on the one hand the expectations and positions the
national papers would stress before the beginning, the coverage during the IGC itself and
on the other hand the perceptions and reactions afterwards.
The often-cited aim of the conference was to ”make the Union fit for enlargement”
which meant to follow up the ”leftovers of Amsterdam”. This involved reforming the
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structure and decision-making procedures of the institutions, namely first of all of the
Council, but also of the Commission and the Parliament. This was why, for the first time,
the governments of the applicant countries from the MOE-states were invited and took
part in the conference. The major problem was the question of how to enable the
institutions to continue working efficiently in the face of nearly doubling in size once the
entries start for real.
What we did not think of in the first place was that, of course, this was only an overall
issue containing many others, to be more precise: The above mentioned institutional
reforms, but also the extension of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and
the rather important, but as we will show, by the papers not as such perceived, ”enhanced
(or closer) co-operation” mechanism, which was constructed to allow countries to co-
operate beyond those common policies which have passed the council by majority or
unanimity, modelled after the Euro-zone or the Schengen-Agreement.
Those were the issues as they are posted on the internet-page of the European
Commission (http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/igc2000/geninfo/index_en.htm#agenda):
– Qualified majority voting
– Closer co-operation
– Defence
– Statute for political parties (Commission contribution)
– the size and composition of the Commission;
– the weighting of votes in the Council;
– the possible extension of qualified majority voting in the Council; and other necessary
amendments to the Treaties arising as regards the European institutions in connection
with the above issues and in implementing the Treaty of Amsterdam
3.2 Selection of countries
We decided to examine newspapers from Germany, Great Britain, Spain and Austria
whether there is a synchronised way of reporting about European topics, or not. We
arrived at the decision to select these particular countries on the basis of two criteria:
The first was the date of entering the European Union, i. e. the duration of
membership, because we assumed that the longer the media of the respective countries
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have been dealing with European issues, the larger the chance (through learning processes
and confidence building) that they would take on a European perspective in covering
them. Therefore we chose one founding member and one from the following enlargement
stages.
The second criteria was the ruling public opinion in terms of being rather supportive
or rejecting towards the EU since this would probably reflect itself in the media. In order
to be able to compare we wanted a sample containing two pro-European and two euro-
sceptic countries. The position taken on by each country’s population should certainly have
an impact on the coverage of the IGC being more open for really European solutions or,
on the opposite, more concerned about the respective national interests. To classify those
attitudes we relied on the Eurobarometer, No. 53 (Spring 2000). EU-wide the support for
membership of one’s own country (determined through the question ”Generally speaking,
do you think that (our country’s) membership of the European Union is a good thing/a
bad thing/neither good nor bad/don’t know?”) was at that point of time in the true sense
of the word average with 49% of the respondents answering ”a good thing”.
Germany, being one of the Big Four and among the founding members, has ever
since the end of the foundation of European Economic Community been one of the
strongest advocates for a united Europe. Taking this and the long duration of membership
into account lead us to classify Germany as a pro-European country, although the support
for EU-membership is, with 41% under-average. There are on the other hand only 15% of
the Respondents considering it as ”a bad thing”, leaving 74% not rejecting the membership
(which is rather much in comparison with the euro-sceptic countries).On the opposite (side
of the channel), Great Britain, entering the EU in 1973, has gained the reputation of
being an ”uncomfortable partner” (Volle 1998), because it has not only been quite
reluctant in its efforts to actively support the integration process but has often tried to
block developments especially towards the deepening of integration. The public Euro-
scepticism is deep-rooted and wide-spread as the Eurobarometer data show: Only 29% of
the population is supporting the British EU-membership with 24% being in opposition.
This makes only 54% not rejecting it.
Spain has proved to be one of the most committed members of the European Union.
Deriving from a political and economical isolation during the Franco era, membership
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(since 1985) will eventually help to consolidate a newly emerging democracy as well as the
transformation of their ailing and underdeveloped economy. The numbers prove this: 67%
answered in favour  of membership, which is way above the EU-average, and a mere 6%
are against it.
And, last but not least, Austria, latest member of the EU since 1995, has had some
stark problems with the recent elections at the end of 1999, when the anti-immigrant
Freedom Party joined the new coalition government creating massive demonstrations in
the country's capital as well as creating tension among the other EU countries. As a result
of the Freedom Party's inclusion in the coalition, all EU Member States broke off bilateral
contact with Austria in February, 2000. This explains why the Austrian people, who used to
be rather sceptic, but in the preceding surveys were on their way to render their opinion,
only supported the membership by 33%, while 25% are opposing it.
Selection of newspapers
In order to gain a more comprehensive picture of the national attitudes towards
European issues we decided to opt in all cases for a rather left-winged and a more right-
winged newspaper. To make a reasonable decision we also had to take into consideration
the respective availability, that is whether or not the chosen newspaper provided an
accessible internet archive. Thus we chose the German dailies ”Die Süddeutsche Zeitung” and
”Die Welt”, ”El Mundo” and ”El Pais” in case of Spain, ”The Daily Telegraph” and ”The
Guardian” for Great Britain. We would have preferred the ”Times” for the conservative
perspective, but it does not offer an online-archive. The Telegraph did prove itself as being
perfectly ”right” enough. The most appealing newspapers for Austria turned out to be ”Der
Standard” and ”Die Presse”. For Great Britain and to a certain extent also for Austria this
selection also provided us with an euro-sceptic and a rather pro-European attitude.
left right
Germany Die Süddeutsche Zeitung Die Welt
Spain El Mundo El Pais
Great Britain The Guardian Daily Telegraph
Austria Der Standard Die Presse
.
– 14 –
3.3. Method
By using the search mode supplied by the internet versions of the newspapers we
gathered our data, i.e. newspaper articles from December 1st to December 14th. The
according articles were found by the help of using the individual search engines from the
newspaper pages by typing in search words, e.g. ”Nice summit”, ”IGC Nice”,
”Europäischer Rat”, ”Regierungskonferenz” and such like according to the national
languages.
Due to a multitude of newspaper articles revolving around this conference we had to
make a preselection to reduce the sheer number. We did so by looking at the headlines of
all the matching articles and the first paragraphs to determine the contents and find out
which were the most discussed issues.  Departing from that result we proceeded by
transferring the remaining articles into the ATLAS.TI computer-based program, which is
designed to support quantitative as well as qualitative analysis by providing a frame within
which ”often extensive amounts of data (can be) managed, extracted, compared, explored
and reassembled” (ATLAS.Ti manual). By coding (see below) all the articles for the issues
as well as the mentioned actors we were then able to compare the data and look for
similarities and accordingly differences (quantitatively) and then try to capture of what
nature these are and where they stem from.
Coding: For the sake of comparison we marked the content of the articles using a set
of  umbrella terms, i.e. codes. For example, in the first working step we coded only the
headline and the first paragraph with codes naming the issue(s) it was about: Enlargement,
German-French relationship, Veto/QMV (Qualified Majority Voting) and such like.
ATLAS was then able to show us that enlargement was the most discussed issue. To
guarantee the reliability, especially when working in a group, of the coding process it is
absolutely necessary that the set of codes is fixed beforehand, new codes should be agreed
on by the group and one has to make sure that each member of the group will code the
same way, that means that all of them would attach the same code to the respective
content. It is advisable that the group will code some articles mutually and does so from
time to time during the working process to ensure the comparability of the data.
It is also useful to mark the kind of article one is dealing with, since there are national
differences in the use of  reports, comments or leading articles. Naturally it makes more
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sense to compare only comparable data. Especially for a qualitative analysis it is important
to know if the article represents the distinct opinion of  a journalist or someone else (as it is
the case with comments) or is primarily stating facts like reports do.
From the accumulated data we became ever more aware of the differences between
the German and the British newspapers in the way they reported about the IGC 2000. That
fact gave us reason enough to pay more attention to these two countries in terms of
history, political as well as economic positions in order to explain the apparent diversity
and the existing problems that exacerbates synchronisation amongst the newspapers in the
European member states.
Research design:
We opted for two different methods to operationalise the guiding research questions
(listed below), combining quantitative and qualitative tools.
1) Is there a similar mass media coverage of the IGC Nice in the chosen member states?
And if so, is there a synchronisation amongst the countries of the issues related to the
conference?
 
 The first question addressed the amount of coverage, which was easy to answer by
counting the articles concerning the IGC as a whole. The degree of Synchronisation on the
other hand was measured by calculating the salience of topics as they occurred in the
different papers. As mentioned above the IGC itself had to deal with a number of issues.
We wanted to see if there were different perceptions of their relevance in the national
public arenas or if some issues discussed in e.g. German papers were no issue at all in the
Spanish ones. We then analysed closer only those articles revolving around the issue
enlargement regarding question 2) and 3).
 
2) Is there also a synchronisation of actors? Who are these actors and are there cross-
border linkages between them?
 Coding the actors and their home countries within ATLAS.Ti enabled us to calculate
the space the respective national papers grant domestic and foreign actors in percentages.
This includes the mere mentioning of names of actors as well as quoting them in the
– 16 –
articles. We also coded for references actors made towards other actors, primarily foreign
or from EU-institutions with the intention to find out about cross-border linkages between
them. Equally important seemed to us to record the function of the actors mentioned, i.e.
were they from the political sphere, experts or from civil society, in order to be able to
have an impression of the accessibility of the Public sphere represented by the media.
 
3) Do the chosen newspapers discuss these European issues from a European point of
view?
Is there any evidence that they mostly confine their coverage to national interests?
To answer this we again did a ranking of the relevance of the articles that seemed to be
primarily concerned with the enlargement issue, but still dealt with several topics from the
IGC-agenda. The intention was to qualitatively analyse how national positions as they are
described by the media differ or if they approach a European perspective. To do this we
looked for returning key-concepts, positive and accordingly negative perceptions of certain
issues, differences in value-based attitudes and also took into account historical, political
and economic developments.
4. Empirical Findings
4.1. Is there an indication for a similar media coverage (synchronisation) of the IGC in
Nice amongst the selected newspapers?
The total number of articles that we found by using the set of search-words in the
given time period amounted in German newspapers to 129, in Austrian to 138, in Spanish
to 66 and in British dailies to 88 articles. Evidently, there is strong indication that the IGC
is of joint interest in all selected member states. What we drew from this result is the
assumption that we can talk about a considerable synchronisation in terms of issues related
to a common European topic.
However, for a more thorough media analysis we had to limit the number of articles to
generate more detailed results. Therefore we decided to concentrate on only one particular
issue at stake during the IGC.
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To avoid any arbitrary choice of topic we began our analysis by reading the headlines
as well as the first paragraph of all the relevant articles to reveal the most discussed topic.
The results of the analysis of all the selected articles coincided: the enlargement-topic
turned out to be of major interest in each of the countries (see table below).
Table 1: Salience of issues in national newspapers regarding the IGC Nice 2000
Issues/Countries Austria
1)
Germany
2)
Spain
3)
UK
4)
Enlargement 17,4% 19,40% 39,4% 17,0%
Council Reform 3,60% 7,60% 0,0% 11,3%
Veto/QMV 5,80% 5,40% 15,2% 22,7%
CFSP 5,10% 6,20% 1,5% 12,5%
Charta 5,80% 3,10% 0,0% 1,3%
Institutional Reforms 22% 10,10% 3,0% 2,3%
Structural Funds 0,00% 0,00% 30,0% 3,4%
National Interest 17,40% 0,00% 3,0% 6,8%
Other Nat. Interests 7,80% 4,70% 7,6% 1,1%
Relation Ger-Fr 9,40% 12,40% 3,0% 2,3%
French presidency 5,10% 12,40% 0,0% 10,2%
Protests 2,20% 3,90% 7,6% 5,9%
Summit Failure 13,00% 1,60% 13,6% 3,4%
Finality/Outlook 5,10% 7,00% 6,0% 0,0%
Others 0,00% 6,20% 0,0% 0,0%
 Legend: 1) Die Presse, Der Standard; total of 138 articles
2) Die Welt, Süddeutsche Zeitung; total of 129 articles
3) El Mundo, El Pais; total of 66 articles
4) The Guardian, Daily Telegraph; total of 88 articles
To comment comprehensively on this (to us) rather unexpected result it would be
important to recall the individual domestic position and attitude towards each agenda topic
individually (cp. part II.). Nevertheless, amongst the national newspapers there is a
synchronised trend retraceable in focusing on particular topics.
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Apart from the mutual interest on the eastwards expansion of the EU, the national
media do show interest in more country-related issues, e.g. the German-French relationship
was a major concern of the German papers and also picked up by the Austrian ones, but
nearly no one noticed it in Spain and Britain. Similar results apply to the interest for the
CFSP as well as for the discussion about quality majority voting. Here, too, we found no
synchronisation in the numbers. There is no really convincing evidence for an overall issue
congruence, but since this was not to be expected because of the special bargaining nature
of the European Council, we must have a closer look at what they actually agree on. (s. 5.)
What we can conclude from this first analysis is, that there appears to be a strong
indication for a synchronised media coverage concerning a particular EU-related topic. The
different national arenas seem to agree that the enlargement process is the major issue in
the context of the IGC 2000, but what conclusions do they draw from that concerning the
reforms which have to be made in order to enable the EU-institutions to continue working
efficiently?  To what extend the various newspapers differ or accord with each other is
subject to subsequent investigation.
4.2 Is there a synchronisation of actors? Who are the actors and are there cross-border
linkages between them?
We assumed that in considering the IGC as an European issue, the statements of the
European actors would be of some importance to all the related countries.
In order to answer that question in a satisfying manner, one has to recall the normative idea
of what an actor is and from what public arena he derives. Friedhelm Neidhardt argues in
his normative approach towards the actor’s importance in the public sphere, that there is
the need for a variety of different actors to appear in the mass media. His basic
assumptions are taken from the Habermasian idea of a deliberative public sphere, where a
number of representative actors are advocating the different opinions and interests of, e.g.
special interest groups, labour movements, parties, experts, in order to eventually have the
chance of influencing legislation. ”Öffentlichkeit erscheint als ein offenes
Kommunikationsforum für alle, die etwas sagen oder das, was andere sagen, hören wollen.
In den Arenen und Relaistationen dieses Forums befinden sich die Öffentlichkeitsakteure,
die zu bestimmten Themen Meinungen von sich geben oder weitertragen: Sprecher und
Kommunikateure” (Neidhardt 1994:7).
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Since some of the mentioned scholars have repeatedly pointed towards the importance
of these actors in the national public spheres, we took on this assumption and applied it to
the supposed emergence of a European public sphere. Here we paid most attention to the
occurrence of international actors in the selected national newspaper articles and coded
them accordingly.
The result of our empirical research, which was solely put into the context of the
enlargement issue, was a striking one. We found out that the national newspapers were any
good to be used as a platform for the emergence of a European public sphere. Not only
the issues in the national newspapers turned out to be primarily of national interest and
only vaguely synchronised, but also the actors were almost invariably national ones. Just in
a few cases and with a selected group of internationally renowned politicians, mostly heads
of states, it was different.
To be precise, the Spanish newspapers mentioned their domestic politicians to the
amount of 31,9 % of all mentioned actors. In Germany (35%) and in Austria (31%) the
preference of national actors was even more significant, but in Great Britain the
newspapers  seemed to be least interested in what other countries’ politicians have to say:
52 % of all the mentioned actors were British.
In Germany  the government actors (G.Schröder, J.Fischer, R. Scharping (in the
proper rank) had a large share of the total appearances, but also the opposition was
represented quite well (Stoiber, Merkel, Gerhardt). Altogether there were 14 different
German actors (compared to the one next in line: only 7 from the EU-institutions).
In Great Britain there were 12 different actors, but in total appearances the
government actors (Blair, Cook, British Officials, Campbell) clearly outnumbered the
oppositions voices (Hague, Maude, Tories).
Most of the countries mentioned in the analysed papers were represented only by their
Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. The oppositions position was not made
apparent.
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One initial hypothesis was that there is hardly any existing cross-border
communication between actors to be found in national newspapers. Otherwise, if there
was an exchange of opinions to be registered, the question would be whether there is any
indication for synchronisation of actors amongst the national newspapers.
In order to test this, we additionally looked for cross-border references, i.e. the
exchange of arguments between actors or merely a reaction on a position someone else had
stated before, e.g. Fischer referring to something Blair said,  - but found nothing. Although
this must have taken place in the negotiations, none of it can be detected in the papers.
This may account to the exclusiveness of the Council meetings itself, and the fact that
information is gathered to a large degree at press conferences, in which single politicians
declare their respective positions and interpret the progress of the conference. In either
case it shows that the public sphere in European terms as it is resembled in the print media
is not a discursive one; there is no exchange of rational arguments as the Habermasian
model suggests. Detrimental to it is also that actors of the autonomous civil society have
no appearance in the media.
Cross-border linkages therefore do exist, but not in a discursive manner. Within the
national public arenas this more marked, especially in GB, where for mainly the euro-
sceptic Telegraph uses references of  well-known Tories (W. Hague, F. Maude) and
interestingly of Ch. Patten  to underline the critique it puts on Blair´ s strategy.
Apart from that, there is indeed synchronisation to be discovered amongst the
international actors who were more frequently quoted in all of the newspapers. The
German and the French actors, in particular Jaques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder, made
their appearance in all of the papers on a strikingly high level. That Chirac had an
outstanding position while representing the presidency of the Council accounts for some of
the appearances, but we suppose that the statements and actions of the ”French-German
motor” of European integration are always considered of  value, because it is them that
provide the guidelines and speed of the process.  Proving this would require a longitudinal
analysis which we can not provide. Tony Blair´s positions were obviously not of major
interest to the other scrutinised papers; although GB is one of the large states, it is not
considered a leading actor (contrary  to its self-perception).
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That means however, that we could not find a wide range of national actors to be
mentioned in the international mass media, but the seemingly most important European
actors do play a major role in all over Europe.
Another interesting result is the above-average appearance of EU-institution actors in
the newspapers. Even though they usually don’t seem to be considered worth mentioning,
EU actors did frequently appear when serving the purpose of reinforcing the immanent
opinion of an article about national interest. All in all in Germany 7 different actors of EU-
institutions made their appearance, starting with German MEPs (J.Leinen (SPD), E.Brok
(CDU)) and R.Prodi, upon the EP and the Commission as actors, up to J.Delors and
G.Verheugen. In GB it was also Prodi who is leading the list ahead of national MEPs
(T.Currie (Tories)) and  Ch. Patten.
As an additional result of the figures presented in the attached table, we found a strong
suggestion that the media seem only to serve the purpose of heralding the interests of
national politicians: only them were given the room to boast about their opinions. Most of
the time direct quotations were selected from speeches or press conferences delivered by a
small selection of national politicians encompassing the national government.
Unfortunately we did not find any other actors like experts, organisation advocates, or
some intellectuals to make themselves heard in any of the scrutinised articles . We found
quite opposed to this demand only one set of speakers, or two if we consider journalists as
an independent group. The dominating group is the political class and within this group the
government representatives have the greatest share of coverage and are being quoted much
more extensively. There was only one quotation of an independent expert to be found in
both German papers. The openness of access is obviously not a given preposition when
you look for it in the media. Therefore it is highly questionable whether the mass media,
and the newspaper in particular, is the right platform to give all the normatively required
actors the chance to contribute evenly to any given discussion. Needless to say that without
the appearance of a wider range of speakers and an increasing interest in the international
political spheres monitored in the national media, an evenly recognised European public
sphere will never occur.
Another interesting point in this contest was that there were yet 4 of the candidate
states among the frequently mentioned actors, among whom the Polish speakers
(Bartoszewski, Buzek and Kwasniewski) were the ones the papers in our sample were most
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interested in. An exception were again the British papers which display a below average
interest in the MOE-states in general.
Table 2:  Frequency of domestic and foreign politicians being mentioned in national
newspapers
Countries Austria Germany Spain GB
Austria 29,90% 1,50% 0,70% 0,00%
GB 4,50% 4,60% 0,70% 52,20%
Czech Rep. 4,50% 2,70% 0,00% 2,00%
Denmark 1,20% 0,70% 0,00% 2,40%
EU Institutions 6,50% 11,50% not coded 10,70%
France 12,30% 9,60% 21,00% 17,80%
Germany 11,10% 35,40% 12,10% 6,30%
Greece 0,00% 0,40% 2,90% 0,40%
Hungary 3,90% 4,20% 0,70% 0,80%
Poland 12,90% 5,70% 8,50% 0,80%
Portugal 1,20% 0,14% 8,50% 0,80%
Slovakia 1,90% 1,50% 0,00% 0,40%
Spain 3,20% 4,50% 22,00% 0,40%
Sweden 3,20% 1,50% 0,00% 0,40%
Legend: only enlargement-related articles
Austria: 24 articles (14 Der Standard / 10 Die Presse)
Germany: 26 articles (15 Die Welt / 11 Süddeutsche)
Spain: 26 articles (18 El  Pais / 8 El Mundo)
Great Britain: 30 articles (11 Guardian / 19 Daily Telegraph)
4.3. Is there Homogenisation in regard to the coverage of the issues from a European
point of view?
The following part is supposed to answer our third research question, which is: Do the
national newspapers discuss the enlargement of the EU in an European way (see page 4)?
Do national differences persist or disappear? We attempted to answer this by looking for
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synchronisation, respectively for homogenisation, i.e. if the media cover the issues with the
same relevance.
 As mentioned above, the Intergovernmental Conference is in this respect a difficult
issue for it is by nature about bargaining between states, which will of course be reflected in
the national print media.
Therefore one can not expect national interests to stand back. We did not expect to
find the same opinion in the media presentation regarding for example the weighting of the
votes in the council of ministers since most of the chosen countries have a very distinctive
interest in this matter, which they are most unlikely to abandon.
One reason for picking the enlargement process in order to investigate it further was,
besides that it is widely discussed in the states of our sample, that it is a very broad issue.
The complex ”enlargement” includes on the one hand the institutional reform for the
ultimate achievement and on the other hand policy issues like the distribution of the
financial subsidies (structural funds); connected to both, the status quo and the national
interests. This openness of the term ”enlargement”  as the most discussed issue within the
conference debate enabled us to look more closely if there really is synchronisation or even
homogenisation.
We found that there is indeed a wide range of issues to cling to enlargement. For this
diagram we included only the five most mentioned enlargement-related issues and ranked
them according to the percentages: Veto/Qualified majority voting (QMV) in the council,
the Council reform (redistribution, weighing of the votes), the commission reform (limiting
the number of commissioners in order to stay capable of acting), the financial subsidies and
the enhanced co-operation project. So we made the right choice in picking the enlargement
topic out of the whole amount of our articles since this seems to contain the reporting of
what was on the Nice conference agenda: the institutional reforms to make the Union
feasible for the entrance of the candidate states.
Nevertheless we are convinced that it is possible to generalise from our data that  the
media apparently talk about the enlargement process, but they are actually not describing
the same thing. That is why we are sceptical in regard to the homogenisation thesis.
– 24 –
Since they also put most clearly emphasis on different issues (see table 3),
synchronisation within the enlargement topic can not be taken for granted, not to speak of
homogenisation. For example, while to the Spanish and the British papers the QMV
extension is of primary interest, the Austrian ones occupy themselves rather with the
enhanced co-operation project and in Germany the major  point of concern was  the
council reform due to conflict with the French  about the weighing of votes.
 As one can easily see the percentages of hits are not very evenly distributed, which
makes it unlikely that there is synchronisation. What differs here from the first figure is that
not even within the most mentioned issue veto/QMV a reasonably similar coverage in the
articles can be detected.
But most importantly, from reading the articles and comparing them to each other we
know that even if to a certain extent the same issues are covered, the content is a quite
different one.  For example, what the table (see below) does show is that the veto/QMV
issue is obviously much more important for Spain (37,5%) and Great Britain (44,8%)
compared to Germany (11,8%) and Austria (10,1%), what it does not show though is that
the first are strongly pro veto and against the extension of majority voting in more than
one policy field while the latter, especially Germany, is very much in favour of the frequent
use of majority voting procedures. The Süddeutsche Zeitung reported after the summit:
”Schröder said, he would have wished for more especially in the modification of the power
of Veto.”  Points of issue were first of all the transition of social security policy and
taxation into the QMV procedure, which failed in Nice due to the British refusal. Other
issues were the structural funds, cultural and financial matters and immigration and border
control.
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Table 3: Positive or negative attitudes towards ”enlargement-related issues”
issues/countries Austria Germany Spain GB
veto/majority voting 10,10% 11,80% 37,50% 44,80%
council reform 7,20% 13,60% 4,50% 20,00%
commission reform 11,60% 6,40% 3,40% 8,10%
financial subsidies 4,30% 2,70% 9,00% 3,40%
enhanced cooperation 14,50% 5,50% 5,60% 1,40%
Legend: Austria: 24 articles (14 Der Standard / 10 Die Presse)
Germany: 26 articles (15 Die Welt / 11 Süddeutsche)
Spain: 26 articles (18 El Pais / 8 El Mundo)
Great Britain: 30 articles (11 Guardian / Daily Telegraph)
The quantitative analysis did discover an apparent similarity of issues, but in the
following part we will show that the way the national newspapers cover them was to a high
degree related to their national attitudes and interests, which is absolutely understandable
and not problematic at all in the case you are not looking for a European public sphere.
Furthermore we found that the domestic political situation in the other member states was
not taken into account by the newspapers. A public sphere is necessarily based on some
rudimentary understanding of  the partners’ approach to and understanding of the issue
that is to be debated.
In order to further investigate with what the national public arenas were concerned
and what perspective they assumed in regard to the European issue Enlargement, we took
an additional look at some articles we considered representative for the attitude displayed
in most of them, trying to take into consideration the respective historical and situational
context, which seem to influence the national coverage to a great extent. Germany and the
United Kingdom as the two poles on the Europhil/Eurosceptic-scale seemed suitable
objects to exemplify our concern.
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5. Data analysis and Interpretation
While looking for a synchronised, i.e. homogeneous media coverage amongst the
given national newspapers concerning the IGC Nice, one has to acknowledge the
peculiarities of any given country. The history of the countries’ EU politics, the overall
political system as well as the style and tone of their national newspapers are chiefly
important to fully understand their handling on EU-related issues to draw a reasonable
conclusion about the potential emergence of a European public sphere.
In this part of our work we try to catch the essence of the respective national
discourse and where it arouses from in order to see if they at all compatible. The question
is why the national public spheres perceive the given issues from a certain perspective. As
V. Schmidt puts it:
”Nations, just as individuals, exercise choice. And the future of [...] European
integration depends upon nations and their citizens continuing to choose openness and
integration. For this, however, the public has to be convinced that the choice is appropriate
and beneficial (...) This is facilitated by the construction of a discourse that projects a
coherent vision  of  how the nation fits into and integrating Europe [...] that also taps into
deeper structure of national identity.” (1998:1)
These discourses or ”frames” differ extensively in Great Britain and Germany. Aside
from a non-existent European media system (Gerhards) and the obvious  lack of a
”communication community” due to language barriers (Kielmannsegg 1996: 55), there are
other limitations to a homogeneous European public: ”Cultural and historically specific
conceptions colour the ways in which new ways of doing and thinking are adopted and
adapted to the political context, and set the limits to the adaptability of the new ideas”
(Schmidt 1998: 9).
Institutional structures and party systems as well as economic interests also play a
major role in helping to understand certain national  perceptions of European issues.
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5.1 Qualitative analysis of British newspapers
The history of British reluctance to participate in the creation of ECSC, and later EEC
- the institutional face of new Europe - is well known; so is the perceived need for Britain
to be a part of it.
The key concept in the British discourse seems to be sovereignty, in the economic
context as well as in the political.
The refusal to join was for "constitutional" reasons (even though this term was not
used), while the desire to join was determined by economic arguments and "political" ends.
Though simplified, this dichotomy, which has not yet altered, goes to the heart of the
difficulty in accounting for British attitude and, therefore, policy, which has always been
one of rejecting any loss of British identity. Many people in the UK are worried about loss
of sovereignty within the EU. ”We would lose the pound, the Union Jack Flag, the Queen,
control over our own affairs” is a recurring statement once the issue is on hand.
 An examination of the UK constitutional behaviour concerning the British "union"
(resurrecting the fact, but not the rhetoric, of its geopolitics) results in the identification of
a number of features which have evidently remained constant. These features focus on the
government at the centre; we have here a centre-perspective which is more than merely the
sum of the institutions of government. However, the ”ruling opinion” is only a projection
of the centre-perspective and, importantly, requires a broader background if it is to be
properly explained.
Moreover, when the overall thrust of policy concerning the UK-union is placed
alongside policy concerning UK and the EU, it becomes evident that in certain important
respects UK-EU policy is simply the reverse, a mirror image, of the UK-union  policy. The
fact of the UK "union", as understood in its proper historical context, appears to exert a
determining influence on the UK attitude to "union" at the level of Europe, and elsewhere.
This line of thinking is predicated upon the identification of a continuing "self-interest" of
the centre as an un-stated guiding principle of action over longer periods. A constitutional
self-image, reflected in the attitude of the British centre to UK "union" plays an evidently
important role in defining British EU attitudes.
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But there is more to explain the stark resistance of the British to fully engage into the
EU project. It has seen ”its interest served by not joining the Euro, in order to keep its
options open with regard to the strong links and ties with the Commonwealth countries,
the US, the countries of Eastern Europe, as well as the far East” (the economist
14.09.2000).
Great Britain has now the lowest inflation rate in Europe, even the lowest
unemployment rate for two decades, the number dropped from 8,9% in 1996 to an all time
low in December 2000 with 3,9 %. In rather prosperous times it fears to loose advantages
once it gives up it’s  currency and lose economic control. On top of that, for many the loss
of the Central Bank represents a potentially significant erosion of nation sovereignty.
A difficult chapter in the British economy has always been the import/export trade
exchange rate. S. Pollard judges: ”Certainly many imports from the continent were at the
cost of the British economy. Calculations showed that it’s losses in the British market since
joining of the EC  add up to some billion pounds” (Pollard 1998: 303). These negative
experiences also marked the British mistrust of the EMU, which is a recurrent topic in the
British media even in the enlargement debate, when the German papers did not seem to
recognise a connection. While Great Britain is greatly in favour of  the European free
market, which means that withdrawal from the European Union is hard to contemplate, it
is strongly opposed to a political Union.
Therefore even more improbable is the possibility that any British government,
constituted under the present arrangements, would actually support the deepening of the
integration process towards a federal model as it is discussed in Germany.
In the UK over time sovereignty passed away from the King to Parliament (the House
of Commons and the House of Lords). Thus now we talk of the sovereign will of
Parliament (which, in practice, means the decisions of the House of Commons). Parliament
is sovereign over those matters, and only those matters, which it can determine simply by
choosing that they should be so. In some countries there is a constitution which limits the
sovereignty of the ruler or ruling council (e.g. the Parliament). In those cases national
sovereignty is not the same thing as the sovereignty of the ruler. However, in the case of
the UK National sovereignty is almost identical with Parliamentary sovereignty, so here we
shall treat them as the same thing. This is why the House of Commons does influence the
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public debate to a larger extent than other parliaments do: ”The British House of
Commons is, because of it’s public sessions, more visible than any other parliament in the
world” (Döring 1998: 163). Because of this visibility and the lack of a written constitution,
British governments are not as free to negotiate in the European Council as most of their
continental partners – and they are similarly closely watched by parliament and the media.
British politicians approach the whole issue of Europe from a totally different set of
assumptions than the political elite of Germany and France. On the one hand, British
politicians artificially separate the national and the European, ignoring the strong existing
links between them. ” [...] Blair said, that he will judge the package not by what it does for
Germany, France and Spain, but by what it does for Britain” (Guardian, 9.12.00)
Ideas about British ”otherness” with regard to Europe, which are aired so regularly
and so hysterically, not only by the tabloid press, took root only relatively recently. They
are, however, widespread. The belief that the British are not Europeans is by no means
restricted to right-wing, extreme nationalist circles (as especially Germans might be quick
to assume).  It is common practice in English to refer to Europe as an entity entirely
distinct from Britain. ” [...] The question is the extend to which each country is prepared to
sacrifice the right of veto in return for the prize of enlargement, which- it is believed,
perhaps wrongly- will bring greater political stability to the continental mainland”
(Telegraph, 3.12.00). However, this distinction is not 'natural'; it was introduced into the
English national discourse at the end of the sixteenth century, at a time when political and
military events were forcing English rulers to entrench themselves on `their' side of the
water.
Another important feature of the British discourse is conflict.
The politicians’ approach to Europe is resembled by the way the newspapers publish about
the EU.  The tone of the media concerning the IGC in Nice contributes to this British
”awkwardness”, or ”otherness” in tone. In an attempt to bully their way into the public’s
conscious, leaders of the opposition (for the lack of parliamentary power) as well as their
medial counterparts, have to apply a rather harsh ton to attract the people’s attention. We
believe that the reason for this lies in the institutional structure of the ”Westminster
model” of democracy (Lijphart 1984: Ch.1) With it’s winner-takes-all principle of the
majoritarian election system, which makes it necessary for British politicians to stress party
differences much more than their counterparts in proportional representative systems on
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the continent. This conflictual manner of agenda-setting is resembled in the British print
media.
Thus the historically and institutionally determined rough tone of the newspapers, the
clear cut positioning of the selected newspapers in terms of political disposition and its
ensuing debates help to understand the extraordinary position of the British press amongst
the other member states. Precisely here we can most evidently begin to mistrust the
concept of a synchronisation amongst the national newspapers.
It does have even more severe real, rather than medial, consequences for British
politicians in their approach to European policy-making  procedures, which are primarily
based on a consensual model like it can be found first of all in Germany. It may not be too
far fetched to say  that British membership in the European Union is probably the best
spur to constitutional change this country has ever had in its long history, but the palpable
hostility towards this decision is regularly repeated in the national media.
Although one can consider the British public sphere coming close to the Habermasian
”arguing” , this seems to be of no benefit to construction of a cross-border public, because,
to readers from consensual democracies, the tone of discussion is unusually hard:  ”A
culture of conflict as a means to reach a consensus? ... to a German observer this must
seem as a contradiction in itself” (Döring 1998: 172).
So sovereignty and conflict are the terms that describe best the attitudes which are in
charge of the media coverage of the Nice conference:
”The Guardian”, but even more so the ”Daily Telegraph” are taking a rather limited
view upon the general outcome of the IGC.  Most of the articles, that were taken into
account for the qualitative media analysis, expose a high degree of topics that do only apply
to national interests.
The national gains seemed to be the most attractive field for a high number of the
journalists, respectively the national readership. One excerpt can be taken as an example
for the hegemonic tone and style of the British media coverage on EU-related topics: . ”
Blair came home able to boast about his victories, having got the most for Britain out of
Europe” (Telegraph, 12.12.00).
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Another article reveals the British attitude even better: ”Mr. Blair said the Nice summit
was a chance for Britain to gain a fairer share of votes in the council of Ministers, the EU’s
law-making body, and to reform  the EU’s creaky machinery to allow for the accession of
12 new members from eastern Europe and the Mediterranean – accomplishing one of
Britain’s long-term strategic objectives” (Telegraph, 8.12.00).
What we can draw from this article is the assumption that it has become a national
habit to paint every little detail revolving around the European Union in British colours to
make the recipients acknowledge the decisions, which can e.g. have a long-lasting effect on
domestic policies. Furthermore,  Blair was seemingly well aware of the strong impact his
performance would eventually have on the outcome of the (by that time imminent)
domestic election.
Much different to the German newspapers and due to history, the differing political
system and the strong Euro-sceptic wave, which is fuelled by the fear for the loss of  state-
sovereignty, British newspapers can evidently not afford to loose sight of the British role
and their gains from all of the decision made on behalf of the European Union. Even if
both countries are talking about the same topic, e.g. enlargement, the starting point as well
as the recipients accepted customs are disproportionate.
5.2. Qualitative analysis of German newspapers
As indicated in the previous section, the German discourse as it is noted down in the
papers is rather different from the British one due to different experiences.
To begin with, we will shortly go back to the first table and discuss an issue, that
distracted not that much attention in Great Britain, but sheds light on the German
attitudes.
As the first table shows for both German newspapers the German-French relationship
is with 12.4% one of the most important issue. Together with the discussion of the bad
performance of the French presidency in the media the coverage of this meta-issue
complex sums up to almost 15%. Does the sympathy between Chirac and Schröder really
make such a difference to the outcome of the enlargement reform process as those
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numbers will make us believe?  It is of course more than that, reminding of the utmost
importance of the German-French ”motor” for the European integration process. And it
also uncovers the German media’s focus on what they perceive interesting their circle of
readers. The amount of coverage of this complex is not nearly as high in the British papers.
It is interesting though that this kind of a meta-issue, which has on the first sight nothing
to do with the conference agenda, became so important. One of the reasons was (as we will
show) that the French government did not behave as ”Good Europeans”, as especially the
German newspapers were quick to realise, because the presidency is usually considered to
let its own national interest stand back behind the Community’s. It was considered bad
luck that just one of the large states hold the presidency at this point of time. One could
assume that this aspect - the blaming of the French presidency for the low outcome of the
conference - was the real European issue in terms of  a Europeanisation of national media
arenas, since all the papers we conducted had a similar (negative) perception of it.
The key concepts that describe the German discussion of the Nice conference are
tying it´s fate to the Integration process and a consensual tone of the public arena.
For Germany there is a deep-rooted consent of ”self-binding” its fate to the success of
the European integration project, which is intact since the founding of the federal republic
after World War I and resolves from the view that Germany has to be saved from itself.
Since journalists are Germans as well, they are very aware of this ”ever stronger self-binding of
the West Germans to a Europe which had become the character of a nation substitute (at least we were on
the right way).” (Die Welt 08.12.00)  The presence of this feeling of doubt about the own
identity and the feeling of guilt could be detected in the adoption of the Goldhagen -
debate, which was still able to rise high emotions in Germany as well as in the constant
success of  TV-documentaries on this issue.
While on the one hand, this consensus is due to the negative experiences in the
context of World War II, it is on the other hand based on the very  sound, positive
experiences (especially economic ones) Germany as a nation made during it’s membership.
Schmidt describes very well the ruling consent in Germany versus the conflict in GB: ”For
most European countries, though, Europeanization has been used by governmental elites
only in a positive way, as an exhortation for the nation to respond to the challenge, as in
France, Germany, and even more so in Italy. In those countries, negative rhetoric with
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regard to Europe has largely been taboo for mainstream politicians of  both the left and the
right, who have a tacit agreement not to question European integration (...). Only in Britain
has the negative rhetoric been significant, with invocations of the incursions of national
sovereignty to European integration.” (1998: 13)
Therefore it is not the case as in the United Kingdom that there is a euro-sceptic paper
on the one and a pro-European paper on the other hand. On contrast, we found that the
German media stick to the official line, regarding the European project as one of the
constitutional aims, and are not able to pick up and formulate the more sceptical tone of
debate with arose in the public since the mid-nineties.  As mentioned above the
Eurobarometer data show that  support for membership is below the EU average among
the German citizens. This allows for doubt in our presumption that the papers will not
only act as a platform for politicians or manipulate the public on their own behalf, but are
actually honestly interested in the peoples opinion, because it is them who will pay  for the
newspaper.
The flipside of the coin ”tying” was of course that the French intention at the
founding of the ECSC was exactly the same: to keep ”the Americans in, the Russians out
and the Germans down” (Chapter 9) The post-war period was therefore dominated by a
balance between the French political and nuclear weight and the German economic
strength. These resentments are still not outdated as the new balance debate around the
Council reform during the IGC 2000 showed
Helpful for bringing Germany back in the community of civilised states was the fact
that the Cold War had already taken shape and therefore the USA had a strong interest in
supporting a strong and united western Europe. This accounts for the for the Marshall plan
as well as for the relatively early granted German membership in the NATO in 1955.
This ”self-tying strategy” has ever since influenced the character of Germany’s
European policy making and the way governments behaved in introducing and mediating
these policies and has found its latest manifestation in the handling of the Reunification.
This need to act very carefully on the European and International floor helped to
overcome the anxieties of the partners, especially France’s, during and after the
reunification process. Germanys almost natural reaction as the largest and ”with a GDP
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more than 25% greater than those of either France, Italy or the UK” (Chapter 9) was to lull
fears through tying herself up in the EMU, although it was not perceived as such as it was
the case in France or the UK. EMU can be considered as the safest way to make a united
Europe irreversible.
This whole complex was the content of more than one article under the label of
”enlargement”, because the long foreseen institutional reform turned out to be such an
intense and emotionally loaded  bargaining process over status quo interests that the media
could not but jump on it.
The question why this ”Egoism of the states is as strong as ever” (Die Welt 13.12.00) is one
of the central concerns of German journalists. In order to answer it they above all name
the End of the Cold war and the lack of pressure it put on the necessity of integration. The
media did not come up with institutional reasons, e.g. the possibility that the German
government has much more room for negotiating than its French or British counterparts
due to the pro-European consent within the political class. There is no effective
parliamentary control of the government reducing the options for concessions and package
deals with are necessary for achieving consensus on the European level.  Prime minister
Tony Blair went to Nice facing an domestic election that was scheduled for spring of this
year. Considering the eurosceptic public opinion in the United Kingdom, he could not but
stick to a very narrow range of  concessions he could possibly make. The British
government is also much more subject to parliamentary control and is in parts only
exercising instructions.  The German papers did not recognise this instance at all and were
therefore mediating a distorted image of the British behaviour at the council summit, which
was principally negative. As the Sueddeutsche Zeitung puts it: ”The Englishman Tony Blair and the
Spaniard Jose Aznar were fighting (...)rather ruthless for their national interests” (SZ 12.12.00)
German journalist are obviously more aware of the French situation, since the restraining
impact of the cohabitation was mentioned more than once in order to account for ”Jaques
Chirac (...)giving the Egoist in Nice”. (ibid.): ”The French cohabitation proved to be a retardant for
Europe.” (ibid.) As in the British case, German journalists do not seem to be aware of these
fundamental differences in the institutional constituencies, which account for different
attitudes and therefore actions as well. If the European citizen are not informed about the
distict characteristics of the (yet) 15 member states beyond cliches, they are not able to
develop acceptance and tolerance towards each other, which seem of utmost importance in
regard to a common public sphere.
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Since German Governments have always tried to present their interests as Franco-
German initiatives it is ever more surprising that Schröder did risk this very special
relationship in order to gain more votes in the council. The media regarded that as on the
one hand stupid but on the other hand as the return of Germany as a normal nation.
Generally spoken the German media presents itself as being mainly pro-European and
in comparison to the British papers as being concerned not only with the German political
options but at least trying to inform their readers about the other countries as well.
The historical analysis of the current agenda is still an important part of the newspaper
comments and a tool for analysing the German Understanding of the EU. Articles are
titled for example ”The German Question” (Die Welt13.12.00). Some quotes might concrete
the omnipresence of the special German history. ”The Shadow of the Past”, which the small
states might bring up (SZ 12.12.00), ” To Paris the binding of the neighbour was and is a sort of
guarantee against a too mighty Germany”(SZ 07.12.00) What is implicit in this sentence is that
this is not only the French interest regarding a powerful, reunified Germany but also the
self-perception. There is no critique of this French position which could be expected to be
perceived as an offence by a journalist of an sovereign nation with fifty years of
democratic, peaceful experience, but it is stated as a fact, not questioned at all.
 The German political identity is explicitly analysed as an issue of concern and a tool
for understanding Europe, for the necessity and the behaviour of the own and the other
member states.
Another line of argument revolving around the necessity of enlargement is the
reminding of a common European history and the founding common norms and aims of
the Union: Peace and economic welfare. The loss of the ” old, trusted spirit of the Rome treaty
and of the ideational blueprints of the founding generation ” (Die Welt 08.12.00).
There are two main strings in the coverage of the enlargement issue to be looked at in
the media: First there is the traditional German, political correct handling of the
enlargement and the institutional reforms due to it. Critical comments do not relate to the
necessity of enlargement as such, but are very moderately stated and concern the handling
of problematic consequences for the German economy, namely the demand of the
opposition for the need to inform the German public about them. The papers went very
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conform with the ”ruling”  opinion here, which has been consensual for the last forty
years, that Germany can only act in Europe within and through the European Union. This
has connotations of enduring this burden and is increasingly difficult to sell to the German
public. It is astonishing though  to which extent the political elite managed to install a
national discourse, which is carried by most political parties, intermediary organisations and
the media as well, although it does not represent the public opinion defined with Neidhardt
not as the ruling but as the people’s opinion.
The second string of argument has its roots in the thrust of the government to gain
more influence in the council and in the fact that it turned to the demand when it became
apparent that sticking to it would mean to severely endanger the German - French
relationship, thus becoming the only government that acted on the behalf of the European
Union, (although of course Germany has the biggest interest in the East and Central
European states to join the Union, because of her geographical and economical situation,
which would allow her to profit both in terms of security and of economical advantages.)
This was interpreted by the papers as a new sign of strength that lies diametrical to the first
string. The German- French relationship was such a big issue in the German papers,
because it was always considered to be the motor of the European integration process.
Since the German political identity depends to a great deal on being a ”Good European”
the risk of breaking this alliance and the consequences this would have on further
Integration were very present all of the time. The papers followed the line of the German
government, which was to ”resolutely” (SZ 12.12.00) demand a stronger consideration of
Germany’s  economic and demographic size in the re-weighing of the votes in the council.
”Satisfaction ” was not a term that was used but it describes pretty well how the papers
greeted this new German face personalised by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder shaking off
the historical burden of political correctness. Nevertheless Schröder’s retreat and his giving
in to equality of votes with France was picked up with relieve. He is being quoted with the
statement: ”If it is about Europe, I am standing in the tradition of the chancellors from CDU and
SPD.” (ibid.)
We believe what was rated so high here was the moral superiority, which allowed for a
feeling of pride or importance that Germany is despite and because of her history the only
country whose identity is already very deeply rooted in the consensual conflict solving
processes which make up the distinct characteristic of the EU and therefore is
paradoxically predestined to be the one who has to take up the responsibility for Europe to
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further integrate. This is not formulated very carefully, again following the government’s
line of understatement not wanting to damage the image of the ”Good European and
Democrat.”
Going beyond the quantitative analysis by taking into account the distinct features of
the German and the British ruling discourses, confirmed our assumption that the
appearance of a homogeneous  public is very unlikely in the near future, because the
perception of the European issue enlargement is not a European one, but seen primarily
through national ”glasses”.
6. Conclusion
In order to answer our research questions sufficiently, the Intergovernmental
Conference in Nice served our group the purpose for investigating whether there is the
emergence of an European public sphere amongst the member states. More precisely, we
embarked upon the undertaking to find evidence of synchronisation and homogenisation
regarding the mass media coverage of the IGC Nice.
As a first result we did find evidence for synchronisation since all the chosen
newspapers covered the IGC extensively. The enlargement issue turned out to be a well
discussed agenda topic with an evenly high amount of articles dealing with that particular
issue in all of the chosen newspapers. Moreover, we found some additional issues of equal
importance like the bad performance of the French presidency or the traditional question
of authority between Germany and France and the questionable ascendancy. The coverage
of these ”meta”-issues has a strikingly different quality than the program-related issues,
which points beyond mere intergovernmental bargaining. The occurrence of such a
consistent set of the same topics amongst the newspapers proved that there is a
synchronisation of issues.
The articles, which we gathered from national newspapers, at first glance seemed to
show a large consistency in being mainly about enlargement. This was actually not the case.
The articles within the enlargement topic contained a similar broadly spread range of issues
as those on the IGC as a whole (s.fig.1) did and it resembled it to a large extent. Our
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method therefore superficially seemed to confirm Grundmann’s thesis of a
Europeanisation of the national media arenas, but we discovered by taking a further look
beyond the title and the first paragraph at the content of the articles the fundamental
differences in the perception of the conference issues - and with it the limited range of his
empirical base.
In terms of actors we also investigated the articles in order to determine the nature and
the origin of the relevant speakers. But interestingly enough, here we found out that all the
national newspapers did not care too much about the international actors, but took most
evidently more stocks in their national actors from the political sphere. Nevertheless we
should not forget to mention one exception: the German and French actors. They were
apparently more frequently mentioned in the international mass media coverage than any
other international actors. Although the selection of actors seems to be very limited and a
thorough international communication (or public sphere) is therefore very unlikely to
emerge, a synchronisation of actors is yet to be detected. We also discovered a respectively
high relationship between the states and the EU-institutions (commission and EP), which
is particularly interesting if you consider the role these actors play at the IGC; that is a
rather marginal role in terms of negotiating. One could speculate that one of the reason for
this is that the institutions increasingly serve as intermediaries between the bargaining
countries.
But the very nature of the mentioned actors did not quite accord with the normative
ideologies. Apart from very few exceptions we merely came across one type of actors in all
of the articles: the politician. That indicates a strong distortion from the theoretical demand
for a well functioning public sphere, which is according to Neidhardt the platform ”for all
those who have something to say”. However, there are cross-boarder linkages which
appear to be of a different sort depending on national interests and preferences as well as
regional proximity.
Regarding our third research question we concentrated on the individual  national set
of favoured issues considering the IGC. There was a strong sense of similarity amongst the
countries towards the given range of enlargement –related topics to report on. However,
the way the individual newspapers covered them turned out to differ quote extensively due
to the national attitudes and interests. We expected to find descriptions of the existing
institutions und about the challenges which they have to handle in the future and therefore
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have to be changed in one way or the other, we expected to find information about the
pre-ins, the candidate states, for whom the whole effort is taken on for. We also thought
maybe that we would find the emphasis on harsh discussion between the government
representatives and bargaining processes ending up with package deals, but most important
of all we thought that the differences in the national coverage would mostly deal with the
different positions of the governments regarding the single institutional reform projects.
This openness of possible divergent opinions but also for mingling coalitions were one of
the reasons to chose the issue in the beginning.
The gap between synchronisation and homogenisation is even larger than we expected
it to be. We found out that the difference of national public media discourses regarding the
leading policy guideline of their governments are a lot more complicated and not only
concerning the differences about how to reform the institutions, but that they depend on
causes which lay much deeper grounded in the history, the self- perception and the political
systems of the analysed states and their publics.
The media emphasise those issues which are important for their own country.
Even more so, they did not seem to take the domestic political situation of the referring
countries into account, e.g. there is not a single hint in the European newspapers pointing
towards the imminent domestic elections in Great Britain to have an effect on Blair’s
performance at the IGC in Nice. Apparently there is a lack of communication between the
national public arenas or, in other words, a missing European public sphere.
The second tremendous limitation to the occurrence of homogeneity is the fact that
the national discourses can not simply merge into one, because they are not compatible,
too different. While in Britain national sovereignty is highly valued, to Germans this is an
attitude they are not really able to understand anymore, because their political identity is
tied up  To the ”ever closer Union”. Institutional arrangements account for the public
arenas completely different tone and culture of criticism, which makes it unlikely that, even
if there was a European paper, its content would be perceived the same way  by Britons
and Germans. The real problem, however, is that citizens in either country are not aware of
these differences and the papers have no interest to communicate this.
From these results we draw the conclusion that despite an existing synchronisation, a
homogenisation, which would eventually lead to a European public sphere could ever
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evolve in the media. The media act on their own logic (Neidhardt): They want to sell
newspapers and they want to sell them to national customers. So there is no incentive for
them to write about European issues in an other than domestic fashion as long as the
citizens themselves are not interested and demand these information. We believe, a public
sphere can only be achieved in two different ways: Firstly one could imagine that new
forms of participation are created through institutional reforms thereby ”functioning as an
agent of consciousness” (Shore 2000), but this is of course a top-down approach. The
second possibility is to opt for the long-run perspective and supporting the development
by well directed strategies like campaigning in favour of Europe and strengthening
especially personal and cultural ties through education and exchange programmes. This
might eventually lead to a European identity with an accompanying public sphere and the
suitable all-European mass media.
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